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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
March 27, 1992 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review 
alleging entitlement to permanent, total disability workers' 
compensation benefits sustained as a result of an industrial 
accident. A Petition for Review of that Order was timely filed 
with this Court on April 24, 1992. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are three substantial issues presented for review: 
(1) whether an injured worker who is injured at work during 
a period of time when he is attempting to return to substantial, 
gainful employment is entitled to recieve workers compensation 
benefits occasioned by his industrial injury; 
(2) whether an injured worker so injured is entitled to 
permanent, total disability compensation where he was in fact 
gainfully employed at the time of his industrial injury, and is 
unable to return or meaningfully attempt to return to work 
following his industrial injury; and, 
(3) whether an injured workers ability to work in gainful 
employment at the time of his industrial injury demonstrates as a 
matter of law that he is not permanently and totally disabled at 
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the time of his industrial injury. 
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of 
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to 
the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) 
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize 
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. State 
Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984). McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
1977) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (5) (b) (1991) is the 
determinative statute in this case. Industrial Commission Rule 
R568-1-17 of the Utah Administrative Rules is also applicable. 
They are each set forth in full in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 
A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
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Mr. Abel seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order 
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to 
workers' compensation benefits occasioned by his industrial 
accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
On November 21, 1990 Petitioner filed an Application for 
permanent, total disability benefits alleging that as the result of 
his March 22, 1989 industrial injury he was no longer able to work. 
(R. at 5) . Respondents alleged that Mr. Abel's industrial 
accident did not cause his permanent, total disability status. (R. 
at 120). A formal hearing was held before an Administrative Law 
Judge on March 12, 1991. (R. at 12). 
Disposition Below 
On October 3, 1991, The Administrative Law Judge found that 
there was no causal connection between the industrial accident and 
the Petitioner's permanent, total disability status. His clciim for 
permanent, total disability benefits was dismissed with prejudiced. 
(R. at 53-65, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B). 
Mr. Abel filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission which was subsequently denied on March 27, 1992. (R. at 
119-122, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C). He challenges 
that final agency action in this Petition for Review. 
Statement of the Facts 
The relevant facts in this matter are not in dispute. 
On March 22, 1989, the Petitioner experienced an industrial 
injury to his lower back while employed by West Jordan Care Center. 
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(R. at 57) . Five years previously, Mr. Abel had been found totally 
disabled by the Social Security Administration and was awarded 
federal disability payments. (R. at 145). Notwithstanding his 
Social Security's determination of his disability, he reentered the 
work force and had been working 3 2 hours a week for several weeks 
prior to his industrial injury. (R. at 32) . He was unable to 
returned to work after his industrial injury (R. at 40, 41), and 
was found to be unsuitable for vocational rehabilitation due to his 
age (over 57 years old); education (into the 11th grade); work 
history (punch press, dye set-up and truck driver); and the 
severity of his overall medical condition. (R. at 60). 
The Medical Panel report, which was adopted by the 
Administrative Law Judge, found that as a direct result of the 
industrial accident, Petitioner sustained a 5% whole person 
impairment. His prior impairments totaled 75%, resulting in a 
total combined whole person impairment of 80%. (R. at 38-47). 
All parties agree that the Petitioner is presently permanently 
and totally disabled. (R. at 61) . The Utah Industrial Commission, 
however, found that Mr. Abel's "industrial accident was not a 
sicrnif icant cause of his permanent total disability" [emphasis 
added], and that he was "basically unemployable on March 22, 1989 
by virtue of his preexisting disabilities." [emphasis added] (R. 
at 120) . Petitioner was awarded benefits for only the 5% whole 
person low back impairment. (R. at 64, 121). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
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Mr. Abel sustained a compensable industrial injury on March 
22, 1989, while in the employ of Respondent West Jordan Care 
Center. Although he was at that time receiving Social Security 
total disability compensation, Mr. Abel re-entered the work force 
and was gainfully employed. He had been working for several weeks 
prior to his injury. The doctors who examined and treated Mr. Abel 
found that he had sustained an industrial injury and that it was 
responsible, at least in part, for his resulting permanent, total 
disability status. The Medical Panel appointed by the Industrial 
Commission concurred. Mr. Abel was unable to return to work after 
the accident, and was not a suitable candidate for vocational 
rehabilitation. 
The fact that one has been found by the Social Security 
Administration, under their statutes, rules and definitions, to be 
"totally disabled" does not mean that one can not still engage in 
gainful employment. In fact, the Social Security Administration 
regulations allow and encourage a totally disabled person to return 
to work, and if such return is successful and sustained, the person 
is then removed from total disabled status. The receipt of federal 
disability benefits does not as a matter of law preclude a worker 
who subsequently returns to work and is there injured and 
completely disabled from also receiving state workers compensation 
benefits. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Petitioner's industrial injury was 
not the precipitating cause of his "permanent, total disability" 
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status. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers' compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, supra.,; J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra. ; Baker v. 
Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra at 1021-1022, 
discussed the proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act 
and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
xemployees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. (Emphasis added). 
In analyzing the record below, this Court should keep this 
fundamental precept of workers compensation law in mind. In doing 
so, it becomes abundantly clear that the final agency action must 
be reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an award 
granting permanent, total disability compensation benefits to Mr. 
Abel. 
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II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY FAILED TO AWARD 
PETITIONER PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION DUE 
TO PETITIONERS INJURIES WHICH WERE OCCASIONED BY HIS 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
The basis for the Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion 
for Review was their conclusion that "We determine that since 
Applicant had already been determined to be permanently and totally 
disabled, his current injury could not and was not, a significant 
cause of his permanent total disability." (R. at 120). In reaching 
that conclusion the Industrial Commission adopted the findings of 
the Administrative Law Judge that: 
.•.The applicant's current unemployable status is not the 
result of the March 22, 1989 accident. Although the 
March 22, 1989 industrial accident may have minimally 
contributed to the applicant's already substantial 
disabilities, that accident did not cause him to go from 
employable to unemployable. The applicant was basically 
unemployable on March 22, 1989. Although he was able to 
work on a very limited basis (part time) at that time, 
for very minimal wages ($3.42/hour) , he was not capable 
of gainful employment due to his significant pre-existing 
disabilities. The applicant did not enter the job 
market, only to be taken out again by the industrial 
accident. Even the applicant stated that he took the job 
at West Jordan Care Center, not as an attempt to return 
to gainful employment, but rather as a way of becoming 
more useful and active. ...the fact remains that he was 
out of the job market when he began work there, he was 
incapable of gainful employment at that time, and he was 
permanently totally disabled as is evidenced by his 1985 
Social Security Disability award. The March 22, 1989 
industrial accident did not cause the permanent total 
disability. The disability was evident even before the 
applicant began work with the Care Center. (R. at 63). 
It is difficult to determine how the Administrative Law Judge 
and the Industrial Commission reached the conclusion that the 
Social Security determination was conclusive and that Mr. Abel was 
not engaged in gainful employment. It should be noted that under 
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Social Security Rules and Regulations, one can be totally disabled 
and still be allowed to engage in gainful employment and earn up to 
$740.00 per month. 20 C.F.R. 404.430. That policy is further 
recognized by Social Security's "Unsuccessful Work Attempt11 (UWA) 
policy contained in Social Security Ruling No. 84-25. (R. at 16-
19). 
In fact, the 1988 statutory modification to the Utah 
permanent, total disability statute specifically adopted the 
federal sequential evaluation process, which such process includes 
a review of an injured worker's ability to return to substantial, 
gainful employment with due acknowledgment being given for 
attempted return to work efforts which prove to be unsuccessful. 
This is particularly true and significant where the unsuccessful 
work attempt is directly caused by a significant industrial injury, 
as here, which effectively precludes the completion of an otherwise 
successful return to work effort. Stated another way, but for the 
industrial injury, the Petitioner may have been able to 
successfully return to work. 
The Worker's Compensation Act should not be construed in such 
a way as to discourage seriously injured workers from attempting to 
return to work as a matter of public policy. In addition, such an 
individual should not be denied the rights, benefits and protection 
of Worker's Compensation insurance coverage which all employees 
enjoy for the simple reason that they have significant prior 
impairments. Failure to accept this reasoning raises serious 
questions concerning possible violations of the federal and state 
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guarantees of equal protection of the law. 
Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission engaged in improper fact finding. The actual Findings 
of Fact portion of the Order as they relate to the March 22, 1989 
industrial injury and it's relation to Mr. Abel's permanent, total 
disability status are grossly inadequate and do not meet recent 
legal requirements. The statements that Mr. Abel was out of the 
job market and not gainfully employed are bald assertions, with no 
reference to the evidence presented. Such summary conclusions do 
not constitute proper fact-finding. In the recent case of Adams v. 
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), the Court stated as 
follows: 
While the purported 'Findings of Fact' written by 
the A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence 
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence 
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a 
finding to truly constitute a 'finding of fact,' it must 
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred.... 
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible 
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the 
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the 
Commission accepted one version over another. The 
evidence shows several possible configurations and 
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes, 
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual 
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in 
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of 
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact 
occurred. Since we cannot even determine why the 
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly 
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of 
the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are 
therefore inadequate. Jd. at 20. 
The Findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted 
by the Industrial Commission are deficient in that they fail to 
address in detail the issue of medical causation. 
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Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law 
Judge, dispute that Petitioner is presently permanently and totally 
disabled, the Industrial Commission does not address the 
Petitioner's inability to perform even the limited work he was 
doing before his industrial injury. The Administrative Law Judge 
spends a great deal of time summarizing and discussing Petitioner's 
prior medical problems, but does not make concise findings as to 
Petitioner's current medical condition, the causes for it and the 
ability of the Petitioner to perform any work in light of the 
industrial injury. That failure manifests itself here in 
inadequate findings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently informed this 
Commission that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make 
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its 
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence 
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion.' Jd. (quoting Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The Industrial Commission's as well as the Administrative Law 
Judge's purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
should at a minimum be vacated and remanded with instructions to 
enter a new Order with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to 
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do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
It is important to note that the Petitioner is not seeking to 
recover twrice for the same disability; rather he only seeks Utah 
Workers Compensation benefits for the incremental loss of the 
minimal wage he was able and in fact was earning at the time of his 
industrial injury. An award of partial disability compensation 
does not fully compensate him for his total inability to work due 
to the final 5% impairment he sustained in his industrial injury. 
The March 22, 1989 industrial injury was the "final straw" 
which rendered Petitioner incapable of performing any gainful work, 
including, significantly, that which he was performing at the time 
of his industrial accident. Prior to that time and despite his 
other impairments, which had led Social Security to conclude that 
he was totally disable under its guidelines, he was nevertheless 
capable of some gainful employment, although not full time work, at 
the time of the industrial injury as demonstrated by the fact that 
he had been working for several weeks and was performing his duties 
in an acceptable manner. The fact that he was able to work is 
evidence that he was not previously "permanently, totally disabled" 
for purposes of Utah's Workman's Compensation benefits. Marshall 
v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984); Entwistle v. 
Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 1981); and Nuzum v. Roosendahl Constr. 
& Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977). 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67(5)(b) (1988), in fact, 
provides in significant part that permanent, total disability 
compensation "...ends with the death of the employee or when the 
employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work". 
(emphasis added). The Petitioner's industrial injury precluded him 
from reaching the point where his work effort could be considered 
"regular, steady work", but he was when he was injured attempting 
to reach that possible plateau. The Utah Workers Compensation Act 
should not be interpreted as discouraging return-to-work efforts 
similar to Mr. Abel's. 
The Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Petitioner 
"was out of the job market when he began work (at the West Jordan 
Care Center)" was incorrect because he was working at the time. 
The fact that he was capable of gainful employment was demonstrated 
by the successful discharge of his job requirements at the time of 
the industrial injury. The Administrative Law Judge erred as a 
matter of law when she held that part time work for $3.42 per hour 
is not gainful employment - it is work and that is all the Act 
requires. The motivation for working need not be exclusively 
economic. One who earns a wage at a job taken primarily in order 
to be "useful and active", is still entitled to permanent, total 
disability benefits, if injured on the job. 
To deny permanent, total disability benefits in this limited, 
minimal benefits claim would be contrary to the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act's policy of encouraging injured workers to return 
to work. As such, it contravenes basic public policy. 
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In addition, the lesser standard of entitlement, referred to 
in the legal literature as the "odd lot" doctrine, is applicable 
and unquestionably met in this case. Specifically, a worker may be 
found to be totally disabled if by reason of the disability 
resulting from the Petitioner's injury, he cannot perform work of 
the general character that he was performing when injured, or any 
other work which a person of his/her capabilities may be able to do 
or learn to do. Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1984). Brundaqe v. IML Freight, Inc., 622, P.2d 790 (1980). 
Clark v. Interstate Homes, Inc., 604 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1979). 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 
1964). Caillet v. Industrial Commission, 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936). 
The Petitioner clearly meets this standard for entitlement. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its March 27, 1992 
Order dening Mr. Abel's claim for permanent, total disability 
benefits. He was gainfully employed, working 32 hours a week at a 
lawful wage at the time of his injury. The uncontroverted evidence 
submitted to the Industrial Commission supports the finding that he 
sustained a permanent impairment due to his 1989 industrial 
accident, and is permanently and totally disabled due to his 
industrial injury. He was never able to return to work thereafter. 
Despite his Social Security disability status, he was permitted and 
able to work. As a result of his industrial injury, he can no 
14 
longer work. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award 
him permanent, total disability benefits. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 19#2. 
VIRGI 
Attorney 
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Rehabilitation. (Last amended 1991) 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial 
accident, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of 
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission 
shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. 
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 
312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of.the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age 
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not 
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate 
under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, 
rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 
35-1-66.7 in excess of the amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks-at 
the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection 
(2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer 
or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid 
out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to?*the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable 
permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its 
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 
35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the 
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to 
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social 
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in 
all cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings 
have occurred: ^ 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under 
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation training. The 
commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $3,000 
for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee. 
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for 
Vocational Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee 
has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the 
EXHIBIT A 
employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding 
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as 
determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with 
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to 
regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or 
the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully 
cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, 
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such 
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated 
according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability 
is required in any such instance, (as last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 
1988 Second Special Session) 
R568-1-17. Permanent Total Disability. 
A. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a 
finding of total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use of the term 
"substance of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some 
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its 
findings relative to permanent total disability. The Commission does not 
interpret the code section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the 
Commission in permanent and total disability shall in all cases be tentative 
and not final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been 
accomplished. 
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee 
has made, or is in the process of making, a determination of disability under 
the foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of 
instituting the process on its own behalf. 
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has 
qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will 
determine if a significant cause of the disability is tjie claimant's 
industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or causes. 
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the 
Commission shall rely upon and be guided by the rules of disability 
determination published by the Social Security Administration Office of 
Disability publication SSA Pub. No. 64-014, as amended. In short, the 
sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of questions 
and evaluations to be made in sequence. These are: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the listed impairments in 
Appendix 1 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her 
previous work? 
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total,disability, the 
applicant shall be referred to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for 
evaluation and rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation determines that the applicant is unable to do any other work 
because of his age, education, and previous work experience, and as a result 
of an industrial accident, there shall be a hearing to review the 
determination of the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation and anv obiections 
thereto, unless the parties waive the right to a hearing. 
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the 
Commission shall issue an order finding or denying permanent total disability 
based upon the preponderance of the evidence and with due consideration of the 
vocational factors in combination with the residual functional capacity as 
detailed in Appendix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014. 
KEY: workers1 compensation, time, administrative procedure, filing deadlines 
1990 35-1-1 et seq. 
35-2-1 et seq. 
35-10-1 et seq. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 90001099 
DARRELL F. ABEL, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
WEST JORDAN CARE CENTER/ 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE 
FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 12, 
1991 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present ^nd was represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Mark Dean, Attorney. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie 
Boorman, Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits 
related to a March 22, 1989 industrial back injury. The carrier, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, and the Employers Reinsurance Fund have denied 
liability for permanent total disability benefits, because they argue that the 
applicant's permanent total disability status is not the result of the March 
22, 1989 back injury. They point out that the applicant was found to be 
disabled by Social Security in 1985, at least 4 years prior to the industrial 
injury. Therefore, they argue that the applicant's current disability is 
primarily related to physical impairments that developed prior to the 1989 
industrial injury. The applicant argues that he was able to return to work in 
1989 not withstanding his significant medical problems and disabilities and 
that it is the 1989 industrial back injury that has caused him to be currently 
unable to work at any job. Because all of the applicant's physical 
impairments had not been rated at the time of the hearing, the matter was was 
referred to a medical panel to obtain ratings for the applicant's 
pre-existing, industrial and overall impairment. It was felt that those 
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ratings would assist in analyzing the cause of the applicant's current 
disability status. The medical panel report was received at the Commission on 
September 3, 1991 and was distributed to the parties on September 9, 1991 with 
15 days allowed for objections. No objections were filed and thus the matter 
was considered ready for order on September 24, 1991. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
I. Medical Problems and Work History Pre-datinR the Industrial Injury 
A. Right Hand Amputation 
The applicant had two operations amputating his right hand in 1965. 
The amputation was necessary as a result of an industrial injury that occurred 
when the applicant was cleaning out a punch press and the brake on the press 
gave way. The operations occurred on February 22, 1965 and March 8, 1965 at 
Providence Hospital in Oakland, California. The only records that are 
contained in the medical record exhibit (Exhibit A-l) regarding the right hand 
injury are the two operative reports (Tab A-12, pp. 58-64). The applicant 
worked for another 20 years following the amputation and per his own 
testimony, he was able to accommodate the loss of the hand very well. 
B. Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) 
Chronologically, the first mention in the medical record exhibit 
regarding this problem is the applicant's admission to Valley West Hospital on 
August 7, 1983 for chest pain (Tab A-ll, pp. 53-56). The records for that 
admission indicate that the applicant was smoking 2 packs of cigarettes per 
day and had a family history of heart disease. The applicant was coughing and 
had chest pain that radiated to his neck with numbness radiating down his left 
arm. Lab studies and an ECG were performed and he was treated with 
nitroglycerin, oxygen and other medications. The final clinical impression 
was: 1) chest pain probably due to pericarditis, 2) acute bronchitis and 3) 
old orthopedic injuries. The next records most likely associated with this 
problem are diagnostic tests done at Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, in 
January and February of 1985. On January 11, 1985 a chest X-ray was taken and 
was read to show probable pulmonary fibrosis (Tab A-14, p. 117). An EKG was 
done on January 18, 1985 (Tab A-14, p. 97-98) and pulmonary function tests 
were done on February 11, 1985 (Tab A-14, p. 118). Dr. G. Woods did an 
evaluation of the problem for Disability Determination Services on March 14, 
1985 (Tab A-14, p. 120). He notes that the applicant continued to have chest 
pains after his 1983 hospital admission. Per Dr. Woods, severe pains occurred 
during and just after coughing spells, with the pains disappearing several 
minutes after the coughing stopped. There was no chest pain associated with 
exertion, but shortness of breath occurred with exertion initially and had 
progressed to occur while the applicant was at rest as well. The shortness of 
breath was variable per Dr. Woods1 s report, with some days of shortness of 
breath while resting and some days where the applicant was able to tolerate 
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mild exertion. Dr. Woods notes that the applicant was coughing every morning 
and has been a one-to-three packs-per-day smoker for 33 years. The applicant 
coughed uncontrollably at intervals during Dr. Woods's examination. Dr. 
Woods's assessment was: 1) chest wall painf EKG does not show changes 
significant for coronary disease, 2) chronic bronchitis, not under optimal 
medical therapy and smoking 1 pack per day, 3) positive PPD. 
The applicant continued to have intermittent hospitalizations for 
exacerbations of his chronic bronchitis* He was admitted to Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital on March 18, 1985 (Tab A-7, pp. 37-38), on March 19, 1986 (Tab 
A-7, pp. 33-36) and again on January 23, 1987 (Tab A-7, pp. 26-30). The 
January 1987 admission was complicated by a hypersensitivity reaction to 
sodium metabisulfite, a common green vegetable preservative, which occurred 
after the applicant ate some celery. The hospital records indicate that the 
preservative was known to cause airway obstruction in sensatized individuals. 
The records for both the March 1986 and the January 1987 admissions note 
continued heavy smoking. A July 22, 1987 medical report of Dr. K. B. Johnson 
indicates that the applicant's condition was moderate to severe chronic 
pulmonary obstructive disease, severe enough to require home use of oxygen 
(Tab A-14, p. 149). The records contain two additional admissions to 
Cottonwood Hospital for exacerbations of the applicant's lung condition. 
These occurred in January of 1988 (Tab A-10, pp. 48-50) and in September of 
1988 (Tab 1-10, pp. 45-47). The applicant testified that he smoked for 45 
years and that at one point he smoked 3 packs per day. He stated that he 
currently smokes 1 pack per day. 
C. Essential, Familial or Intentional Tremor 
Chronologically, the first mention of this tremor in the medical 
record exhibit is found in a report of Dr. G. Woods dated May 6, 1985 (Tab 
A-14, p. 106). In that report, Dr. Woods indicates that the applicant's 
respiratory condition had improved with outpatient therapy, but that the 
applicant felt he was unable to work due to a resting tremor in his head and 
hand. Dr. Woods notes that the tremor made tasks involving fine motor 
coordination difficult and that the tremor had increased as a result of 
bronchodilator medication the applicant was using. Dr. Woods recommended a 
neurological consultation regarding the tremor. The applicant was evaluated 
by Dr. D. Thoen of Western Neurological Associates in Salt Lake City on May 
28, 1985 (Tab A-14, pp. 95-96). Dr. Thoen notes that the applicant had had 
the tremor in his arms for a number of years, with the left being worse than 
the right. He notes that the tremor had slowly gotten worse. Dr. Thoen found 
that, as a result of the tremor, the applicant had a very difficult time 
writing and would have difficulty manipulating small objects. He found that 
the tremor became more severe when the applicant was agitated or when he was 
concentrating on doing something. Dr. Thoen concluded that the applicant's 
respiratory problems precluded use of the only medication that is known to 
help the problem (Inderol). The applicant testified that this tremor did not 
prevent him from being a truck driver. 
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D. Diabetes 
The applicant has adult-onset diabetes which he testified was 
diagnosed 8 years ago. The applicant began treatment for his diabetes in 
February 1989 at the Family Medical Center in West Jordan, Utah. It is 
unclear what treatment he had for the diabetes prior to that. The applicant 
was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital on February 22, 1989 for "diabetes 
mellitus out of control." Initially, there was consideration of insulin 
therapy, but the applicants blood sugar was stabilized by way of diet and 
medication and he was discharged on February 23, 1989 with the indication that 
insulin would be avoided at that point. The discharge summary (the only 
record in the medical records submitted) for that hospitalization indicates 
that the applicant's diabetes mellitus was poorly controlled due to many 
factors including, recent upper respiratory infections with bronchitis, lack 
of diet therapy, prior prednisone use and underlying continued tooth 
abscesses. The applicant testified at hearing that he controls the diabetes 
with medication and diet and he is not currently insulin-dependent. The 
applicant testified that he has some eye problems as a result of the 
diabetes. 
E. Cervical Spine 
The first mention in the medical record exhibit regarding treatment 
for this condition is a Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital emergency room visit 
on September 29, 1986 (Tab A-7, p. 31). The only note on the record for this 
visit is that the applicant was given a cervical collar for neck pain. A CT 
scan of the cervical spine was done at Holy Cross Hospital on November 12, 
1986 (Tab A-14, p. 150). The scan report indicates that the film was 
difficult to read due to the applicant's short neck and broad shoulders. 
There did not appear to be significant stenosis of the bony spinal canal, but 
the film was read to show some apparent narrowing of the intervertebral 
foramen on the right of C6-7 and • slight narrowing of the intervertebral 
foramen on the left at C5-6. Dr. K. B. Johnson found that the applicant had 
diffuse degenerative joint disease, most marked in the cervical spine (Tab 
A-14, p. 149). The applicant testified that he has headaches sometimes as a 
result of his neck condition and he indicated that he was given a neck brace 
at some point by some doctor. 
F. Other conditions 
The applicant mentioned he had been in an automobile accident in the 
past and had broken his collar bone, but it is not clear when this occurred 
and there are no records for the relevant treatment. The applicant stated 
that he had a water retention problem at one point in the past, but that this 
resolved itself (no records regarding any treatment for this are included in 
the medical record exhibit). The applicant had chronic left epididymal 
orchitis and as a result had a left orchiectomy and vasectomy performed at 
Cottonwood Hospital by Dr. G. Middleton on November 14, 1985 (Tab A-10, pp. 
51-52). The applicant testified that he takes medication for his cholesterol. 
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G. Work History 
The work history provided by way of testimony is fairly general in 
nature and dates were not provided. The applicant testified that he worked 
for 20 years as a truck driver, driving dump trucks and 18-wheelers. The 
applicant worked as a punch press operator in the 1960 fs and this is when he 
lost his right hand. Per the Social Security records, the applicant worked as 
a nurse at th VA Hospital from 1975 through 1980 and then was employed for 
approximately 2 months in 1980 at West Jordan Care Center taking care of 
retarded children. From June of 1980 through July of 1984, the applicant 
drove a delivery truck for Ireco Chemicals. The applicant was also employed 
as a security guard beginning in December of 1984. The applicant originally 
applied for social security disability in early 1985 under a primary diagnosis 
of status post right hand amputation. He was denied on that application and 
he reapplied with a primary diagnosis of severe familial tremor, left upper 
extremity and secondary diagnosis of amputation right forearm. The applicant 
was granted benefits based on that application in 1987 with the benefits 
beginning as of January of 1985. The applicant was apparently unemployed from 
1985 until he got his job with the defendant West Jordan Care Center shortly 
before his injury in March of 1989. 
II. The Industrial Injury and Treatment Following that Injury 
The applicant is a male who was 56 years old on the date of injury 
(March 22, 1989). The applicant had his wife and hi^ wife's son living with 
him on that date. On the date of injury, the applicant was employed with West 
Jordan Care Center as a trainer/nurse*s aid. In that position, he was earning 
$3.48 per hour working 32 hours per week. The applicant testified that he had 
been receiving Social Security Disability benefits for 5 years when he got the 
job at West Jordan Care Center. The applicant stated that under the Social 
Security Disability system, a disabled person is allowed to work and earn a 
certain amount of money. The applicants wife was working as a trainer and 
she told the applicant about the job at West Jordan Care Center. The 
applicant indicated that he did not like being unemployed with nothing to do 
and thus he decided to take the job. The job involved dressing, feeding and 
bathing the residents of the Care Center. The applicant attended a 
orientation meeting in which the new trainers were told what would be expected 
of them. The applicant testified that he felt that he could do the necessary 
work. 
On the date of injury, the applicant was moving a resident from his 
wheelchair to his bed. The resident was a mentally retarded adult (18 to 20 
years old) named Kelly who weighed between 110 and 115 pounds. The applicant 
had to get Kelly out of the wheelchair and up onto the bed (which was about 2 
feet higher than the seat of the wheelchair). The bed was to the left of the 
applicant and behind where he was standing. The applicant turned quickly as 
he lifted Kelly and as he did so, Kelly began to move around. This caused the 
applicant and Kelly to fall to the floor. The applicant testified that he 
felt a sharp pain in the low back one or two inches below the belt line and he 
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also felt pain in his legs for a couple seconds. The applicant managed to get 
Kelly into the bed, but he recalls that his back hurt as he did this. The 
applicant stated he turned in an accident report after getting Kelly into bed 
and he went home. The applicant did not return to work after that because he 
was unable to lift residents after the injury. 
The applicant recalls seeing Dr. R. Davis at the Family Medical 
Center in West Jordan the day following the injury (March 23, 1989). However, 
Dr. Davis*s records indicate that the applicant was first seen for his 
industrial back injury on March 24, 1989. The records indicate that 
medication was prescribed and the applicant received heat and ultrasound 
therapy on March 24, 1989, March 28, 1989 and March 30, 1989. The applicant 
had just one heat/ultrasound treatment in April of 1989 (on April 5, 1989), 
but the applicant was treated at the Family Medical Center for his diabetes 
and removal of a foreign body in his left hand in April of 1989. In May of 
1989, the applicant was given 8 heat/ultrasound treatments at the Center and 
he was also treated for a leg injury, diabetes, hypertension and knee pain 
that month. At the Family Medical Center, the applicant saw Dr. R. Davis, Dr. 
A. Jacoby, Dr. D. Hartmann and Dr. A. Rivera apparently alternately. The 
applicant testified that he was referred to the Burns Chiropractic Center by 
Dr. Hartmann in late May of 1989. Lumbar X-rays were taken there on May 23, 
1989. It is unclear from the records what treatment, if any, was provided 
thereafter. 
On May 31, 1989, the applicant was referred, to Western Neurological 
Associates for a CT scan of the lumbar spine. The scan was read to show very 
little facet degeneration with no evidence of disc herniation or fracture. It 
is unclear what treatment, if any, the applicant got during June of 1989. 
There are no records for June of 1989 in the Family Medical Center 
information. In July of 1989, the applicant began again with heat/ultrasound 
treatments for the low back at the Family Medical Center. He had 13 
treatments that month at the Center and he was also seen there for his 
diabetes. In August of 1989, the applicant had 18 heat/ultrasound treatments 
for the low back at the Family Medical Center. On August 11, 1989, he was 
referred for a second CT scan of the lumbar spine. The Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital scan was read to show mild degenerative changes without 
evidence of focal herniated disc disease. From August 15, 1989 through August 
24, 1989, the applicant was involved in testing for a functional capacity 
evaluation at Jordan Valley Physical Therapy Rehabilitation and Sports 
Medicine. The conclusion reached by the evaluator was that the results were 
invalid due to loss of the applicant's right hand and the back and leg pain 
that the applicant was having during the testing. On August 24, 1989, the 
applicant had an MRI of the lumbar spine done at Utah Neurological Associates, 
but a report from that MRI is not included in the medical records. On August 
31, 1989, Dr. R. Davis wrote the carrier indicating that the applicant had 
developed lumbar spine dysfunction and myofascitis due to an industrial injury 
and that he was 80% disabled from his current job and needed retraining. 
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In September of 1989, the applicant had 16 heat/ultrasound treatments 
at the Family Medical Center and he was also seen there for his diabetes. On 
September 25, 1989, the applicant was seen by Dr. E. Spencer at the request of 
the carrier. Dr. Spencer diagnosed the applicant as having mild degenerative 
disc disease with hip abductor weakness and referred pain to the lateral 
thighs and back. Dr. Spencer opined that the applicant had more of a muscle 
strain than a disc injury and he found that the applicant had 0% impairment 
resulting from the injury with no future medical care required for the 
industrial injury. In October of 1989, the applicant received 23 
heat/ultrasound treatments at the Family Medical Center and he was also 
treated there for a upper respiratory tract infection, diabetes, bursitis and 
otitis. On October 24, 1989, Dr. J. Zahniser of Western Neurological 
Associates wrote Dr. Jacoby at the Family Medical Center, apparently offering 
a neurological consultative opinion. Dr. Zahniser read the lumbar CT and the 
MRI (apparently the one taken on August 24, 1989 at Western Neurological 
Associates) as normal and he concluded that the applicant had chronic low back 
pain associated with musculoskeletal abnormality. He states in his report 
that he agreed with Dr. Davis fs myofascitis diagnosis and he found the 
applicant should seek non-lifting employment. On October 26, 1989, Dr. R. 
Davis wrote a letter to whom it may concern indicating that the applicant's 
back was not stabilized and the applicant was not released to return to work. 
In November of 1989, the applicant got 16 heat/ultrasound treatments 
to the low back at the Family Medical Center and he was also treated there 
that month for asthma, pneumonia, diabetes and otitis^ On November 16, 1989, 
Dr. Davis completed a summary of medical record form indicating that the 
applicant had a 15-20% permanent impairment to the low back with none of it 
pre-existing the March 22, 1989 industrial injury. The applicant continued 
with his heat/ultrasound treatments from December 1989 through April of 1990, 
getting approximately 20 treatments per month during that time period. The 
applicant was also treated at the Family Medical Center for renal 
insufficiency, high cholesterol, diabetes, upper respiratory tract infections, 
insomnia, urinary tract infections, bronchitis and prostatitis during the 
December 1989 through April of 1990 time period. 
In May and June of 1990, the applicant cut back his heat/ultrasound 
treatments to 11-12 treatments per month. From July of 1990 through October 
of 1990, the treatments again were around 20 per month. The applicant was 
seen regularly at the Family Medical Center for his diabetes and he was seen 
episodically for urinary tract infection, prostatitis, cholecystitis, asthma, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and upper respiratory tract infection. 
In November of 1990, he began regular treatment at the Family Medical Center 
for hypertension. Beginning in December 1990, the applicant cut back his 
heat/ultrasound treatments to around 10 per month and this continued through 
March of 1991. Although the number of visits for heat/ultrasound after March 
of 1991 are difficult to assess, the applicant continued with these treatments 
fairly regularly. 
ORDER 
RE: DARRELL ABEL 
PAGE EIGHT 
In March of 1991, the applicant was seen by Alan Heal regarding 
rehabilitation. When interviewed, the applicant indicated that he had 
constant low back pain with frequent right leg pain to the foot. The 
applicant indicated to the evaluator the he believed that his condition would 
not improve. The applicant indicated that he could sit for one hour and that 
standing and sitting cause his legs to go numb. The report indicates that the 
applicants shortness of breath caused him to be unable to be in certain 
environments, that his diabetes caused problems for him reading and that his 
hand tremor caused writing to be difficult. Alan Heal concluded that the 
applicant could do some kind of work, but was not fit for competitive gainful 
employment. In March of 1991, both Dr. R„ Davis and Dr. A. Rivera of the 
Family Medical Center provided letters indicating that the applicant was 
disabled due to his back and a number of other medical problems. Dr. Davis 
opined that the applicant had a 15-20% disability due to the lumbar condition 
alone. 
At hearing, the applicant indicated that he still had constant low 
back pain and stiffness that was worse at times. He stated that his legs go 
numb to the knee at times and go out from under him. The applicant stated 
that he still took soma and oxycodeine and that he could not sit or stand for 
long. The applicant stated that he uses a cane to walk and that he did have 
some back braces that he used just after the date of injury. He indicated 
that future surgery is not recommended for him due to his lung condition. The 
applicant stated that he considers his back to be his most serious medical 
problem. The applicant stated that this is because fie was able to work (at 
West Jordan Care Center) with his other medical problems, but could not work 
after the March 22, 1989 industrial injury. The applicant considers his 
diabetes to be the second most serious problem employment-wise, because it 
prevents him from being a truck driver or a chauffeur and prevents him from 
being able to do the charting that is necessary for nursing. The third most 
disabling condition the applicant finds is his chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease which he finds prevents him from moving around in a hurry for a long 
time. The applicant feels he can do none of the prior jobs that he has had 
and he stated that currently he is not very active. He stated that when he 
spoke with Rehabilitation (apparently the State Office of Education) they told 
him that because of his age, it would take too long to retrain him to do light 
work. 
The appointed medical panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. M. Thomas, a 
neurologist and Dr. B. Holbrook, an orthopedist. The panel was asked to rate 
the applicant's numerous medical conditions. The panel rated as follows: 
MEDICAL PROBLEM WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT 
right hand amputation 
at the wrist 57% 
chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD) 50% 
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essential or familial tremor Mi-
di abet es M 
cervical spine dX 
low bacik i1'. 
thoracic spine .'"X 
orchidectomy 
i ight cJ a i/i cle 
cardiac 15% 
meralgia paresthetica 
The panel found that only the low back impairment (5%) was attributable to the 
March 22, 1989 industrial accident. Combining all the percentages, in the 
manner that: is required bj the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, the panel arrived at a total combined impairment of 80* ~* *-v,~ 
whole person. 
I! ONCI .USIONS OF L AW: 
There is no question that the applicant is permanently totally 
disabled. The applicant meets the Social Security guidelines for total 
disability, which guidelines have been adopted in Utah by statute (U.C.A. 
35-1-67) and by ri ile (R490-1 17) for 1 .lie purpose of analizing permanent total 
disability workers compensation claims. The issue to be resolved in this 
case is whether the permanent total disability was caused by the March 22
 f 
1989 industrial accident. If so, the applicant :i s entitled to an award of 
permanent total disability benefits, if not, his permanent total disability 
claim must be dismissed (R490-1-17 (C) and Larse v. Industrial Commission, 758 
P 2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). 
In analizing the cause of the applicants permanent total disability, 
t lie applicant argues that his low back condition is the medical problem that 
most effects his employability. He points out that he was able to work as a 
trainer/aid at the care center prior to his back injury, and now, because of 
his low back symptoms, is unable to do that job. He argues that he was able 
to work at the care center with over 75% whole person impairment and so that 
pre-existing impairment cannot be considered the cause of his disability. 
Rather, he points to the March 22, 1989 back injury as the "final straw" which 
made him unable to return to any kind of work. The ALJ finds the applicant's 
argument logical and not without merit. However, the ALJ finds that the 
arguments for no causal connection between the industrial injury and the 
permanent total disability are al so very compel 1 ing. 
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The applicant was determined to be permanently totally disabled by 
Social Security as of Jaunaury 1985. As noted above, the same criteria used 
by Social Security in making a finding of total disability is now used by the 
Industrial Commission in determining whether an applicant is permanently 
totally disabled for purposes of workers compensation. Therefore, per 
Industrial Commission statute and rule, the applicant qualified as permanently 
totally disabled in January 1985, 4 years prior to when he had the industrial 
accident at issue (March 22, 1989). If the industrial accident occurred after 
the applicant was already determined to be permanently totally disabled, then 
it is very difficult to say that the March 22, 1989 industrial accident CAUSED 
the permanent total disability. 
Besides looking at the sequence of events, the ALJ finds that it is 
also advisable to review the applicants disabilities and the causes of those 
disabilities. In doing so, the ALJ notes that the applicant's most serious 
employment disabilities do not necessarily correspond to the permanent 
impairments that carry the highest percentage rating. For example, the right 
hand amputation was not a serious employment disability for the applicant, in 
and of itself, even though it rates 57% whole person. The applicant worked 
productively for many years when this was his only major impairment. However, 
when this impairment was combined with the development of the chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease in 1983 and the familial tremor in 1985, the 
applicants employment disabilities became significant. The applicant was 
precluded from employment that was exertional in nature, as well as from any 
sedentary work that required fine motor skills, and i£ was at this point that 
Social Security found the applicant totally disabled. 
Currently, the applicant states that he feels his back problems are 
the major cause of his inability to work, but the ALJ finds that the evidence 
does not support this feeling. The applicant's back has not been operated on 
and there have been no significant radiological findings which would suggest 
that any acute injury to the back occurred on March 22, 1989. The panel feels 
that the back has very minimal impairment and that the physical therapy 
passive modalities that the applicant has received for the back over a period 
of several years are probably not necessary. The applicant has indicated that 
he has many symptoms that can be associated with low back injury, like 
numbness in the legs and inability to sit or stand long, but it is not clear 
that all these symptoms are related to the industrial accident. The panel 
indicates that the applicant's leg numbness is a separate condition known as 
meralgia paresthetica and that this condition is not related to the industrial 
accident. It simply is not clear whether the limited sitting and/or standing 
are due to the leg numbness or result due to the industrial accident. 
However, even if one concedes that the industrial accident caused some 
limitation to the applicant's ability to sit and stand over long periods, he 
should still be able to do some kinds of light or sedentary work. What 
prevents him from doing this kind of work is his pre-existing impairments and 
their associated disabilities (inability to do sedentary manual work due to no 
right hand and the familial tremor that effects the left hand, impaired 
eyesight due to the diabetes and the factors of age and lack of 
training/education). 
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light of the foregoing discussion, the ALT find*; thai Hie 
applicant did have a compensable work injury on March 22, 1989 and he is 
therefore entitled to workers compensation benefits associated with the low 
back injury that resulted due to t .he accident Based on the evidence 
currently before the ALJ, this would include medical expenses and permanent 
impairment benefits for a 5% whole person low back impairment. Howcsver, it 
does not include permanent total disability benefits. The applicant's current 
unemployable status is not the result of the March 22, 1989 accident. 
Although the March 22, 1989 industrial accident may have minimally contributed 
to the applicant's already substantial disabilities, that accident did not 
cause him to go from employable to unemployable. The applicant was basically 
unemployable on March 22, 1989. Although he was able to work on a very 
limited basis (part time) at that time, for very minimal wages ($3.42/hour), 
he was not capable of gainful employment due to 1 :i:i s significant pre (existing 
disabilities. The applicant did not enter the job market, only to be taken 
out again by the industrial accident. Even the applicant stated that he took 
the job at West Jordan Care Center, not as an attempt to return, to gainful 
employment, but rather as a way of becoming more useful and active. The 
applicant should be commended for his decision to work at the care center 
helping other disabled persons. However, the fact remains that he was out of 
the job market when he began work there, he was incapable of gainful 
employment at that time, and he was permanently totally disabled as is 
evidenced by his 1985 Social Security Disability award. The March 22, 1989 
industrial accident did not cause the permanent ,total disability. The 
disability was evident even before the applicant began work with the care 
center. 
Although the applicant is MOT entitled to an award of permanent total 
disability benefits, he is entitled to medical expenses and permanent 
impairment benefits as noted above. The carrier has already paid a 
significant amount in in medical expenses related to the treatment of the 
applicants low back, and it is not clear whether outstanding expenses exist. 
As this issue was not raised at the hearing, t .he ALJ wi 1 ] presume that there 
are no denied medical billings at this time. If medical expenses are at issue 
now or become an issue in the future, the applicant can file a separate 
application for hearing regarding medical expenses Based on the Commission 
file, the carrier has not paid any permanent impairment benefits. The panel 
found that the applicant has a 5% whole person permanent impairment due to the 
March 22, 1989 industrial accident, and thus the carrier should pay 15.6 weeks 
of benefits at $85.00 per week (average weekly wage of $111.36 x .667 = $74.28 
+ $10.00 for 2 dependents = $85.00 when rounded off as required by U.C.A. 
35-1-75)
 f or a total of $1,326-, 1)0 Attorney fees are figured per R490-1-7 at 
20% of 1 .his amount or $26* on 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent 
total disability benefits associated with the March 22, 1989 industrial 
accident is dismissed with prejudice based on failure to establish the 
requisite causal connection between the industrial accident and the permanent 
total disability. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, West Jordan Care Center 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay the applicant, permanent partial 
impairment benefits at rate of $85.00 per week, for 15.6 weeks, or a total of 
$1,326.00, for the 5% whole person low back impairment sustained as a result 
of the March 22, 1989 industrial accident. That amount is accrued and due and 
payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and 
less the attorney fees to be awarded below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, West Jordan Care Center 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay all medical expenses incurred 
as the result of the March 22, 1989 industrial injury, said expenses to be 
paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this 
Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, West Jordan Care Center 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for 
the applicant, the sum of $265.20, as attorney's fees in this matter, said 
amount to be deducted from the accrued aforesaid award of the applicant. 
IT rs FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, aH<f, Unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant which was received on November 4, 1991 in the 
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-3 2. 
The applicant was previously found to be total 1 y disabled by 
the Social Security Administratioi \ in 1985, and has been receiving 
Social Security related disability benefits. After having worked 
for several weeks at a part time job for minimal wages in a nursing 
home on March 22, 1989, applicant injured his back, and now claims 
that he should receive Utah Workers Compensation benefits for the 
incremental loss of the wages he was earning at the time of his 
injury, Applicant's Motion for Review, at 3 J 
After a hearing, and after a medical panel had reviewed 
applicant's case, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the 
applicant had a compensable work injury on March 22, 3989, and that 
applicant was entitled to medical expenses, and permanent 
impairment benefits for a five percent impairment to the low back. 
However, she found that the applicant was not entitled to an award 
of permanent total disability benefits since the applicant was 
"basically unemployable on March 22, 1989" by virtue of his 
significant preexisting disabilities, Order, ALJ, at 1 1. 
The medical panel rated the following percentages of whole man 
impairment for the applicant's preexisting conditions: (1) 
Amputation of the right hand in 1965- 57%; (2) pulmonary disease-
50%; (3) tremor- 5%; (4) diabetes- 5%; (5) cervical spine- 6%; (6) 
thoracic spine- 2%; (7) esophagus- 0%; (8) hypertension- 0%; (9) 
orchidectormy- 5%; (10) right clavicle- 2%; (11) cardiac- 15%; and 
(12) meralgia paresthetica, bilateral- 2%. Report, Medical Panel 
at 8. The medical panel determined that: the March 22, 19 8 9 
industrial injury did not medically aggravate a preexisting 
impaired condition of the applicant. Report, Medic:- Panel at 9. 
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With regard to the compensable low back injury on March 22, 
1989, among others, the panel determined that infrequent 
consultation would be required, and that emphasis should be placed 
on a weight reduction program. Id. 
The applicant contends that the ALJ erred by interpreting the 
rules in such a manner that public policy was violated. That is, 
the Workers' Compensation Act should not be construed in such a way 
as to discourage seriously injured workers from attempting to 
return to work. Applicant's Motion for Review, at 3. We do not 
believe that the benefits awarded by the ALJ in this case 
diminished the noble aim of returning injured workers to the 
workplace. In this case applicant was awarded his medical 
expenses, cind a permanent partial disability of five percent. 
In this case, applicant had already been found to be totally 
disabled by the Social Security Administration before his most 
recent injury. U.C.A. Section 35-1-67 (1953 as amended in 1988) 
required the IC to adopt rules with regard to permanent total 
disability that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-matking process of the Social Security Administration under 
20 C.F.R. The IC promulgated such rules in 1990 under R490-1-17. 
Since the Social Security Administration determined that the 
applicant was permanently and totally disabled in 1985, we can use 
this information and are not required to reinstitute the process. 
Id. at B. We are also obligated to determine if a significant 
cause of the disability was the applicant's industrial accident or 
some other unrelated cause or causes. Id. at C. 
In applying U.C.A. Section 35-1-67, the rules implementing 
this statute state that the Commission "is deemed to [possess] some 
latitude ... in exercising a degree of discretion in making its 
findings relative to permanent total disability." R490-1-17A (Utah 
Admin. Rules 1991). We determine that since applicant had already 
been determined to be permanently and totally disabled, his current 
injury could not, and was not, a significant cause of his permanent 
and total disability. 
We therefore agree with the ALJ that the applicant's 
industrial accident was not a significant cause of his permanent 
total disability. 
We further decide that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Oirder of the ALJ were correct in law and fact, and are 
supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated October 3, 1991 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear a] ] costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for ap£ve^ls purposes. 
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